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A BRIEF ESSAY DEFENDING THE DOCTRINE OF
OBJECTIVE CHANCES AS A VALID THEORY FOR
INTRODUCING EVIDENCE OF AN ACCUSED’S
UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT
Edward J. Imwinkelried ∗

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) reads:
(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may
be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident. On request by a defendant
in a criminal case, the prosecutor must:
(A)
provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any
such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial; and
(B)
do so before trial—or during trial if the court, for good
cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice. 1
Rule 404(b) has been described as “the most controversial of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.” 2 That description is accurate. The numbers tell the story. In
federal practice, Rule 404(b) generates more published opinions than any other
provision in the Federal Rules. 3 In many states, errors in the admission of uncharged
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1. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
2. Dora W. Klein, The (Mis)application of Rule 404(b) Heuristics, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 706, 709
(2018).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Rule 404(b) has become the
most cited evidentiary rule on appeal.”); Rules of Evidence (Supplement): Hearings on Proposed Rules of
Evidence Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 203
(1973) (letter of Professor Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.) (“[Rule 404(b)] is the issue of evidence most often
raised in the federal appellate cases.”); Dora W. Klein, Exemplary and Exceptional Confusion Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 666 (2017) (“According to some commentators, the
rule appears in appellate court decisions more than any other rule of evidence.”); Thomas J. Reed,
Admitting the Accused’s Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule 404(b), 78 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 211
(2005) (“Since 1975, Rule 404(b) has been the most contested Federal Rule of Evidence.”); Byron N.
Miller, Note, Admissibility of Other Offense Evidence After State v. Houghton, 25 S.D. L. REV. 166, 167
(1980) (“Admissibility of evidence of other acts, wrongs, or crimes is the most frequently litigated
question of evidence at the appellate level. . . . “); Klein, supra note 2, at 709 (“Rule 404(b) is perhaps the
most controversial of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
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misconduct evidence are the most common ground for reversal in criminal cases. 4
These numbers are hardly surprising. Testimony about an accused’s other crimes can
be so prejudicial that it is “often virtually decisive of the whole case.” 5 As a practical
matter, the introduction of such evidence can strip the accused of the presumption of
innocence. 6 As one commentator colorfully put the matter, uncharged misconduct
evidence can “sink the defense without [a] trace.” 7
Under Rule 404(b), the challenge facing the prosecutor is to articulate a
non-character theory of logical relevance—a theory of admissibility that does not
entail a forbidden assumption about the accused’s personal, subjective bad character.
In the past three decades, one purportedly non-character theory, the doctrine of
objective chances, has become increasingly prominent. Wigmore’s monumental
evidence treatise contains a classic illustration of the doctrine:
The argument here is . . . from the point of view of the doctrine of
chances,—the instinctive recognition of that logical process which
eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances
of the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot
explain them all. . . . [T]he mind applies this rough and instinctive
process of reasoning, namely, that an unusual and abnormal
element might perhaps be present in one instance, but the oftener
similar instances occur with similar results, the less likely is the
abnormal element likely to be the true explanation of them. Thus,
if A while hunting with B hears the bullet from B’s gun whistling
past his head, he is willing to accept B’s bad aim or B’s accidental
tripping as a conceivable explanation; but if shortly afterwards the
same thing happens again, and if on the third occasion A receives
B’s bullet in his body, the immediate inference (i.e. as a
probability, perhaps not a certainty) is that B shot at A deliberately;
because the chances of an inadvertent shooting on three successive
similar occasions are extremely small. 8
In the 1959 Ian Fleming novel, Goldfinger, the archvillain restates Dean Wigmore’s
insight in vernacular terms: “Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. The third
time it’s enemy action.” 9
As previously stated, in the past few decades the doctrine of chances has
become one of the most common weapons for prosecutors seeking to introduce
evidence of an accused’s uncharged misconduct. As the first part of this essay points

4. See, e.g., Patrick Wallendorf, Note, Evidence – The Emotional Propensity Exception – State v.
Treadaway, 116 Ariz. 163, 568 P.2d 1061 (1977), Special Action from Remand Sub Nom. State v.
Corcoran, __ Ariz.__ , __ P.2d __ (1978), 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 153, 156 n.29 (1978).
5. P. B. Carter, The Admissibility of Evidence of Similar Facts (pt. 2), 70 L. Q. REV. 214, 215 (1954).
6. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 179 (1971).
7. D.W. Elliott, The Young Person’s Guide to Similar Fact Evidence–I, 1983 Crim.L.Rev. 284, 284;
see also People v. Smallwood, 722 P.2d 197, 205 (Cal. 1986) (en banc) (“the most prejudicial evidence
imaginable against an accused”).
8. 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 302 (2d ed. 1923).
9. Quoted in Stephen E. Fienberg & D. H. Kaye, Legal and Statistical Aspects of Some Mysterious
Clusters, 154 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 61, 61 (1991).
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out, prosecutors frequently employ the doctrine in child abuse prosecutions. In such
prosecutions, the accused often argues that there was no actus reus because the
child’s injuries resulted from an accident. The initial part explains that in cases such
as the 1974 United States v. Woods decision, 10 numerous courts have allowed the
government to introduce evidence of other injuries the child suffered while in the
accused’s custody to negate the accident claim. The courts reason that the larger the
number of injuries suffered by the child, the less probable it is that all the injuries
were accidental. In drug prosecutions in which the prosecution evidence establishes
the accused’s possession of a contraband drug, the accused frequently contends that
he or she lacked knowledge of the presence of the drug. In such cases, the courts
routinely permit the government to adduce evidence that on other occasions the
accused was found with illegal drugs on his or her person or in an automobile that
he or she was driving. 11 The rationale is that although innocent persons sometimes
find themselves enmeshed in suspicious circumstances, the assumption of innocence
weakens as the number of similar incidents increases. Finally, American prosecutors
have just begun to press the doctrine into service as a way to establish the identity of
a perpetrator as the accused. British courts have long recognized this application of
the doctrine. 12 As Lord Salmons wrote, when several independent complaints of
similar offenses all identify the accused as the perpetrator, “common sense makes it
inexplicable on the ground of coincidence.” 13 American courts are also starting to
appreciate the doctrine for this purpose. 14 Indeed, in the recent prosecution of Bill
Cosby the prosecution invoked the theory. 15 In short, although the doctrine of
chances has a relatively short track record in the United States, it has already become
a prosecutorial mainstay in several important types of cases, including prosecutions
for child abuse, drug possession, and sexual assault.
The rub is that although courts increasingly resort to the doctrine to justify
the admission of an accused’s uncharged misconduct, there has been a constant
drumbeat of criticism of the doctrine. The thrust of the criticism is that the doctrine
does not possess genuine non-character relevance. Rule 404(b)(1) prohibits the
proponent from “prov[ing] a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” 16 Simply stated, the rule
forbids the prosecution from using the accused’s bad character as circumstantial

10. 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974).
11. See, e.g., Michael H. Graham, Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Culpable Acts Evidence: The Waning
Penchant Toward Admissibility as the Wars Against Crime Stagger on; Part I. The War on Drugs–The
Seventh Circuit Crosses Over to the Dark Side, 49 CRIM. L. BULL. 875, 880–91 (2013); David P. Leonard,
The Use of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence to Prove Knowledge, 81 NEB. L. REV. 115, 148 (2002).
12. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Boardman [1975] AC 421; R. v. Scarrott [1978] QB 1016; R.
v. Tricolgus, 65 Crim.App. 16 (C.A. 1976).
13. Boardman at 462.
14. See, e.g., People v. VanderVliet, 508 N.W.2d 114, 125, 128–29 (Mich. 1993).
15. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Evidentiary Issue Crystalized by the Cosby and Weinstein
Scandals: The Propriety of Admitting Testimony About an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct Under the
Doctrine of Objective Chances to Prove Identity, 48 SW. L. REV. 1 (2019); Chris Francescani & Linsey
Davis, Bill Cosby’s Fate Could Turn on a Pivotal Court Decision Expected Next Week, ABC NEWS (Mar.
1, 2018, 11:08 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/bill-cosbys-fate-turn-pivotal-court-decisionexpected/story?id=53450806 [https://perma.cc/9Z37-ACSZ].
16. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
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proof of conduct, that is, the perpetration of the charged offense. A number of
commentators have argued that the doctrine of chances is merely bad character
evidence in disguise. Professor Paul Rothstein stated that “[i]t is inescapable” that
the doctrine rests on a verboten propensity inference. 17 Mr. Andrew Morris asserted
that the doctrine fails unless you posit that the defendant has a “constant,” 18
“continuing,” 19 and “unchanging” 20 character “across time.” 21 For her part, Ms. Lisa
Marshall insists that the doctrine “is propensity based.” 22 Most recently, Professor
Frederic Bloom contended that the doctrine’s logic requires that the accused’s
propensity or penchant “holds steady” during all the acts, both charged and
uncharged. 23
The thesis of this essay is that those criticisms are misconceived. This essay
argues that rather than continuing to criticize the doctrine itself, evidence law
reformers should shift their attention to the manner in which the courts administer
the doctrine. The first part of the essay describes the doctrine of objective chances
and distinguishes it from character reasoning. The second part of the essay surveys
the criticisms of the doctrine while the third part explains why those criticisms are
unsound. The fourth and final part elaborates on steps that should be taken to improve
the administration of the doctrine: more rigorous enforcement of the foundational
requirements for the doctrine, more widespread adoption of a requirement for pretrial
notice of the intent to offer Rule 404(b) evidence, and the revision of Rule 105
limiting instructions given when uncharged misconduct evidence is admitted
pursuant to the doctrine of chances.
A DESCRIPTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF CHANCES AS A NONCHARACTER THEORY OF LOGICAL RELEVANCE
As the introduction suggested, whenever the prosecution offers testimony
about an accused’s uncharged misconduct, the proffer implicates the distinction
between two fundamentally different theories of logical relevance. On the one hand,
as we shall see, the common law and the Federal Rules of Evidence forbid the
prosecution from relying on verboten character reasoning. As Rules 404–05 teach,
the prosecution may not use prior misconduct to prove the accused’s law-breaking
character and then invite the trier of fact to treat that bad character as circumstantial
proof of the accused’s guilt. On the other hand, both the common law and the Rules
may allow the prosecution to introduce the misconduct evidence under a noncharacter theory of logical relevance, that is, a chain of reasoning which does not
posit the accused’s subjective bad character as an essential assumption.

17. Paul F. Rothstein, Intellectual Coherence in an Evidence Code, 28 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 1259, 1261
(1995).
18. Andrew J. Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Fictitious Ban on Character Reasoning
from Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181, 194, 201 (1998).
19. Id. at 195, 201.
20. Id. at 201.
21. Id. at 194.
22. Lisa Marshall, Note, The Character of Discrimination Law: The Incompatibility of Rule 404 and
Employment Discrimination Suits, 114 YALE L.J. 1063, 1072 n.28 (2005).
23. See Frederic Bloom, Character Flaws, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 1101, 1144 (2018).
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What precisely does the character prohibition, codified in Rule 404(b)(1),
forbid? By its terms, the Rule forbids a proponent from relying on the following
chain of reasoning as a theory of admissibility:
FIGURE 1
THE ITEM OF------------>THE INTERMEDIATE----------->THE FINAL
EVIDENCE
INFERENCE
INFERENCE
The accused’s
other misdeed(s)

The accused’s subjective
bad character

On the occasion
alleged in the pleadings
the accused acted “in
character,” consistently
with his or her subjective
bad character

As Figure 1 indicates, a character theory of admissibility requires the trier
of fact to draw two inferences, each of which poses a significant probative danger.
Under a character theory, the trier’s first task is to decide whether to infer the
accused’s subjective bad character from the evidence about the accused’s uncharged
misdeeds. That task necessitates that the trier consciously address this question:
What type of person is the accused? What is his or her character? However, in our
system of jurisprudence, we criminalize conduct, not status. 24 Indeed, the Supreme
Court ruled that it offends the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment to criminalize status. 25 We punish persons for what they do, not for who
they are. 26 If we force jurors to concentrate on the question of an accused’s character,
there is a substantial risk they will be subconsciously tempted to punish the accused
for his or her uncharged misdeeds. That risk is especially acute if there is no
indication that the accused was convicted of, or punished for, those misdeeds. 27 In
short, the first step in a character theory poses what the English philosopher Jeremy

24. See, e.g., Thomas J. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidenced in
Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 731 (1981); Kathleen E. Weidner, Evidence - State v.
Ellis: The Other Wrongful Acts Rule, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 281, 284 (1981).
25. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[A] concomitant of the
presumption of innocence is that a defendant must be tried for what he did, not for who he is.” (quoting
United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1985))); People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 504
(Mich. 1988) (“[I]n our system of jurisprudence, we try cases, rather than persons.”).
27. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 362 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“This danger
is particularly great where . . . the extrinsic activity was not the subject of a conviction; the jury may feel
the defendant should be punished for that activity even if he is not guilty of the offense charged.” (quoting
United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc))); Brown v. Commonwealth, 763
S.W.2d 128, 130 (Ky. 1989) (“[T]he jury may be persuaded that the defendant escaped justice in the
earlier case and resolve to see that it does not happen again.”); Calvin W. Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing
and the Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence: A Sliding Scale of Proof, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 556,
561 (1984) (jurors may subconsciously desire to “sanction the defendant for another crime he seems to
have ‘got away with’” (quoting R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE at
219 (2d ed. 1982))); Joan L. Larsen, Comment, Of Propensity, Prejudice, and Plain Meaning: The
Accused’s Use of Exculpatory Specific Acts Evidence and the Need to Amend Rule 404(b), 87 NW. U. L.
REV. 651, 669 (1993) (the accused has evidently “escaped unpunished” for the other act (quoting 1A JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 58.2 (Peter Tillers ed., 1983))).
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Bentham referred to as the risk of “misdecision.” 28 Even if jurors would otherwise
find a reasonable doubt as to the accused’s guilt for the charged offense, jurors may
be tempted to convict as a way to punish the accused for his or her prior misconduct.
In the words of the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 403, jurors may succumb to
the temptation to “deci[de the case] on an improper basis.” 29
Now consider the relationship between the intermediate inference and the
final inference. Drawing that inference requires the jury to use the accused’s
subjective character as a predictor of conduct on a specific occasion, that is, at the
time of the charged offense. The available psychological research becomes relevant
here. On one hand, the research tends to show that jurors are likely to attach a good
deal of weight to the accused’s character in forecasting his or her conduct. 30 To make
this forecast, jurors may rely on an oversimplified assessment of the accused’s
character. 31 On the other hand, the same body of research indicates that a generalized
construct of a person’s character is a poor predictor of their conduct on a particular
occasion. Case-specific factors tend to be more influential than the person’s
character. 32 A prediction is especially hazardous when it is based on only one
instance of conduct. “At best, behavior on one occasion predicts behavior on another
occasion at around the .30 level” 33—far worse than random chance. The bottom line
is that the second inferential step presents the danger of overvaluation: the juror may
give the accused’s subjective character far more weight than it deserves in deciding
how the accused behaved. 34 Like the risk of misdecision, the danger of overvaluation
can lead to a wrongful conviction. Hence, character reasoning poses two significant
probative dangers and the concurrence of those dangers represents the policy
rationale for the general character prohibition.
Now, contrast this with the theory of logical relevance underlying the
doctrine of objective chances:

28. 6 JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence; For the Use of NonLawyers as Well as Lawyers, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 105 (John Bowring ed., William
Tait 1843).
29. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
30. See Robert G. Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look at an Interminable Problem,
50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 758, 776 (1974).
31. See generally Miguel Angel Mendez, California’s New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence
Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003 (1984);
Roderick Munday, Stepping Beyond the Bounds of Credibility: The Application of Section 1(f)(ii) of the
Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, 1986 CRIM. L. REV. 511, 513 (“Psychologists have reported for several
decades on the tendency of people to judge one another on the basis of one outstanding ‘good’ or ‘bad’
characteristic. This is popularly known as the ‘halo effect.’ . . . This tendency to exaggerate the
representativeness of particular conduct is especially dangerous in the case of the misconduct and bad
character of the accused.”).
32. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the “Grotesque” Doctrine of Character Evidence: The
Reform Implications of the Most Recent Psychological Research, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 741, 749 (2008).
33. William Fleeson, Toward a Structure- and Process-Integrated View of Personality: Traits as
Density Distributions of States, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1011, 1013 (2001).
34. See D. W. Elliott, The Young Person’s Guide to Similar Fact Evidence-I, 1983 CRIM. L. REV.
284, 287.
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FIGURE 2
THE ITEM------------->THE INTERMEDIATE------------>THE FINAL
OF EVIDENCE
INFERENCE
INFERENCE
Other incidents
The objective improbability
One or some of
the accused was
of so many accidents (an
the incidents
involved in
extraordinary coincidence)
were not
accidents
The theory depicted in Figure 2 is not only superficially different than the
theory depicted in Figure 1. More importantly, it is distinguishable from the theory
depicted in Figure 1 in terms of the policy considerations that inspire the character
prohibition. In Figure 2, the intermediate inference is the objective improbability of
so many accidents. To draw that inference, the jurors need not consciously advert to
the question of the accused’s personal, subjective bad character. 35 Of course,
whenever a judge admits evidence of an accused’s other misdeeds, there is a danger
that a lay juror may independently engage in forbidden character reasoning.
However, at least on request by the defense counsel, the judge will give the jury an
instruction forbidding them from relying on that type of reasoning. 36 Although in the
past academic commentators often generalized that limiting instructions are
ineffective, that generalization may be badly overstated. 37
Next, consider the second inferential step in Figure 2. Under a character
theory, the jurors must use the accused’s personal, subjective character as a predictor
of conduct on a particular occasion. Figure 2 differs in this respect as well. Now the
jurors must use their common sense to determine which contention is more
plausible—the defense’s contention that all the incidents are accidents or the
prosecution’s contention that at least one or some of the incidents amount to crimes.
Of course, that is exactly what the pattern instructions in every jurisdiction direct
jurors to do, namely, draw on their experience and common sense to evaluate the
relative reasonableness of the competing theories of the facts. 38
The seminal case announcing the doctrine of chances is a 1915 English
decision, Rex v. Smith, 39 the famous “Brides in the Bath” case which is excerpted or

35. See United States v. Aguilar-Aranceta, 58 F.3d 796, 799 (1st Cir. 1995) (“The justification . . . is
that no inference as to the defendant’s character is required.”); United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1350
(7th Cir. 1991) (explaining that under the doctrine of chances, the “inference is purely objective, and has
nothing to do with a subjective assessment of [the accused’s] character”); People v. VanderVliet, 508
N.W.2d 114, 125, 128–29 (Mich. 1993).
36. See FED. R. EVID. 105.
37. See infra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., 1A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS–CRIMINAL § 10.01, at 29 (5th ed. 2000) (a pattern Seventh Circuit
instruction tells the jury that in evaluating a witness’s credibility, the jurors should “use [their] common
sense . . . and consider the evidence in light of [their] own observations in life”); 1 LEONARD B. SAND,
JOHN S. SIFFERT, WALTER P. LOUGHLIN & STEVEN A. REISS, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS §
7.01 (1997) (“In deciding the question of credibility, remember that you should use your common
sense . . . and your experience.”); See also United States v. Troop, 890 F.2d 1393, 1397 (7th Cir. 1989)
(“[J]uries, in reaching their verdicts, are allowed and expected to draw on their common sense in
evaluating what is reasonable to infer from circumstantial evidence”).
39. R. v. Smith [1914-15] All ER 262 (Eng.).
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at least cited in virtually every American evidence coursebook. The accused, George
Smith, had recently married a woman named Bessie Mundy in a purportedly legal
union. Bessie had inherited a large sum of money from her father. She was soon
discovered drowned in her own bathtub. The accused alleged that her death was
accidental and denied any involvement in it. In other words, the accused claimed
there was no actus reus. To rebut that claim, the prosecution offered testimony that
two other women the accused had purportedly married were “found drowned in their
baths in houses where they were living with” the accused. 40 The defense protested
that the admission of the testimony would be a blatant violation of the restrictions on
bad character evidence. However, the trial judge admitted the testimony.
On appeal, the court sustained the trial judge’s ruling. The court agreed with
the defense that the prosecution could not offer the testimony to show the defendant’s
bad character and then invite the jury to treat that character as proof that George had
murdered Bessie. 41 However, the court ruled that the testimony was logically
relevant on an alternative theory that would shed light “upon the question whether
the acts alleged to constitute the crime charged in the indictment were designed or
accidental.” 42 The court focused on the objective improbability of so many accidents
befalling the accused. 43 Either one or some of the deaths were the product of an actus
reus, or George Smith was one of the unluckiest persons on the face of the earth. 44
Using Smith as a benchmark, it was relatively easy for later courts to
identify the essential elements that the prosecution must prove in order to invoke the
doctrine: (1) the accused was involved in the uncharged incident; (2) the uncharged
incident was similar to the charged incident; and (3) considering both charged and
uncharged incidents, the accused has been involved in that type of incident more
frequently than the typical person. 45 For element (1), in federal practice, Federal Rule
of Evidence 104(b) governs the preliminary fact of the accused’s personal
involvement in the other incident. 46 According to the text of 104(b), the prosecutor
need present only enough foundational testimony “to support a finding that” the
accused was involved. 47 The judge does not make a final decision whether the
accused was personally involved. Rather, the judge plays a limited screening role,
inquiring only whether the prosecution has presented enough credible evidence to
allow the jury to rationally find that the accused was personally involved. In
Wigmore’s view, in deciding whether the prosecution has satisfied foundational
element (2), a judge need not find that the incidents are identical. Rather, the

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 262.
Id.
Id. at 263-64 (quoting Makin v. Attorney-General for New South Wales [1894] AC 57).
See ZELMAN COWEN & P. B. CARTER, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 138 (1956); RUPERT
CROSS & NANCY WILKINS, AN OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, at 233–34 (6th ed. 1986); RICHARD
EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF AND PROBABILITY, 92–93 (2d ed. 1983).
44. See Elliott, supra note 34, at 289.
45. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens
Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 594,
595–97 (1990).
46. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b); see also Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 682 (1988).
47. FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
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incidents need only be similar in their “gross” features. 48 Finally, for element (3) the
issue is not the absolute number of incidents. Rather, the issue is the relative
frequency of the occurrences: Has the accused been involved in such incidents more
frequently than the average, innocent person? 49 What is the baseline frequency for
such events in the general population? Does the combination of the charged and
uncharged incidents involving the accused amount to an extraordinary coincidence,
exceeding that baseline frequency? In some cases, the judge can reasonably assume
that the baseline frequency is one. Some events are obviously “once in a lifetime”
occurrences: one can ordinarily expect to find one’s spouse drowned in the bathtub
only once.
THE THREE USES OF THE DOCTRINE OF CHANCES
When the prosecution can lay the three-element foundation described
above, American courts have been willing to apply the doctrine. As the introduction
noted, the courts have allowed prosecutors to introduce uncharged misconduct under
the doctrine to establish the occurrence of an actus reus, prove the accused’s mens
rea, and even demonstrate the accused’s identity as the perpetrator. We shall now
briefly examine each of those three uses.
It should come as no surprise that American courts permit prosecutors to
use the doctrine to prove the occurrence of an actus reus. After all, that was the
purpose for which the landmark decision, Rex v. Smith, allowed the prosecutor to
introduce the testimony about the drowning of the other two women George
purportedly married. The American courts frequently uphold the application of the
doctrine for that purpose in child abuse cases. The introduction mentioned the Woods
case, 50 the leading American authority on this variation of the doctrine of chances.
In Woods, the accused was charged with infanticide. The victim, a child in the
accused’s custody, died after exhibiting symptoms of respiratory difficulty and
cyanosis, a distinctive bluish discoloration of the skin. Like George Smith, Martha
Woods denied that there was an actus reus; she contended that the child had
accidentally suffocated. To rebut that contention, the prosecution offered evidence
that over a 25-year period, children in the accused’s custody had suffered 20 cyanotic
episodes. The trial judge admitted the evidence over a defense character objection,
and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court cited Smith. 51
The record contained competent evidence that the accused was personally involved
in all 21 incidents; all the children were in her custody at the time of their episode.
There were sufficient similarities among the incidents—she was the custodian of all
the children, and all suffered cyanotic episodes. Finally, the total number of
episodes—21—was so staggering that the third element of the doctrine was
undeniably satisfied. The court found it objectively “unlikel[y]” that so many

48. 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 304 (2d ed. 1923).
49. See Imwinkelried, supra note 45, at 597.
50. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974).
51. Id. at 133 n.8.
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children in Martha’s custody would “accidental[ly]” experience the same sort of
cyanotic problem. 52
Significantly, the Woods court understood the limited nature of the
inference supported by the applicability of the doctrine of chances. The doctrine’s
applicability does not dictate the inference that all of the incidents are non-accidental
or even that the charged incident is non-accidental. There is nothing about the logic
of the doctrine that singles out the charged incident as a crime. The only warranted
inference from the doctrine’s applicability is that one or some of the incidents are
likely not accidents. In Woods, the court stressed that the lower court record
contained testimony by a distinguished forensic pathologist, Dr. Vincent DiMaio,
that there was a 75 percent chance that the charged death was a homicide. 53 The
opinion strongly suggests that absent Dr. DiMaio’s testimony, the prosecution’s case
would have been legally insufficient to sustain a conviction. 54
After approving the use of the doctrine to prove the occurrence of an actus
reus, the courts moved on and accepted the use of the doctrine to establish the
accused’s mens rea. While the actus reus often arises in child abuse cases, drug
prosecutions are the most common setting in which prosecutors invoke the doctrine
to justify the introduction of uncharged misconduct to prove mens rea. Treating
uncharged misconduct as proof of intent is the most common use of uncharged
misconduct evidence. 55 The existence of a mens rea is often the central battleground
in drug prosecutions. As a practical matter, the accused may be unable to deny that
he or she had the drugs in their luggage or an automobile they were driving, but they
can still claim that they were unaware of the drug’s presence because a third party
had secreted the drugs in the luggage or automobile. Confronted with that claim,
prosecutors often turn to uncharged misconduct to prove the accused’s guilty
knowledge. 56 More specifically, they frequently invoke the doctrine of objective
chances to justify admitting the uncharged misconduct. Suppose, for example, that
on the charged occasion the police lawfully found cocaine hidden behind a panel in
a car driven by the accused. The accused might deny any knowledge that there was
cocaine in the car. However, assume that on a prior occasion when the police stopped
the accused’s driving a different automobile, they also found cocaine in a hidden
panel. The trial judge might have the same reaction as the judge in Smith: that
misfortune might happen to an innocent person once in his or her lifetime, but the
occurrence of such a similar event twice to the same person is an extraordinary

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 134.
Id. at 130.
See id. at 135.
See 22B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE and
PROCEDURE § 5242 (Supp. 2016); Thomas J. Reed, The Development of the Propensity Rule in Federal
Criminal Causes 1840-1975, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 299, 306–07 (1982).
56. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, “Where There’s Smoke, There’s Fire”: Should the Judge or the
Jury Decide the Question of Whether the Accused Committed an Alleged Uncharged Crime Proffered
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404?, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 813, 838 (1998).
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coincidence that defies common sense. Today, invocation of the doctrine to prove
mens rea is a commonplace occurrence in criminal trials. 57
The final step in the evolution of the doctrine of chances in the United States
has been its recent extension to prove the accused’s identity as the perpetrator. 58
There are far fewer American cases on this use of the doctrine, but once again
American courts are following the English example. The leading English precedent
is the House of Lords’ celebrated decision in R. v. Boardman. 59 The accused was a
school headmaster. Several students accused him of sexual misconduct. The
speeches by all five Lords invoked the doctrine to justify admitting one student’s
accusation to prove the truth of another student’s accusation. 60 In Lord Morris’
speech, he asserted that “it [is] unlikely that two people would tell the same untruth”
while “having considerable features of similarity.” 61 Lord Halisham stated that the
strikingly similar, unusual features “common to the two stories” constituted “a
coincidence which is against all the probabilities. . . . “ 62 For his part, Lord Cross
reasoned that “[t]he likelihood of such a coincidence obviously becomes less and
less the more people there are who make the similar allegations and the more striking
the similarities in the various stories.” 63 However, the Lords appeared to agree that
the accusations must be truly independent. Lord Morris noted there was no evidence
in the record below that the two boys had “conspired” or “collaborated.” 64 Lord
Wilberforce also cautioned against applying the doctrine in any fact situation in
which there was evidence of “collaboration or concoction.” 65
There are less than a handful of American decisions putting the doctrine to
this use. 66 However, in the process of advocating for the legislative provisions that
later became Federal Rules of Evidence 413–15, 67 the Office of Policy Development
(OPD) of the Department of Justice endorsed the use of the doctrine to prove identity:
It is inherently improbable that a person whose prior acts show that
he is in fact a rapist or child molester would have the bad luck to
be later hit with a false accusation of committing the same type of

57. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Criminal Minds: The Need to Refine the Application of
the Doctrine of Objective Chances as a Justification for Introducing Uncharged Misconduct Evidence to
Prove Intent, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 851 (2017).
58. See Imwinkelried, supra note 15, at 3.
59. [1975] AC 421 (Eng.).
60. Id. at 427–38, 439–40, 443–44, 446–47, 449–50.
61. Id. at 441–42.
62. Id. at 446, 453.
63. Id. at 459.
64. Id. at 441–42.
65. Id. at 444.
66. See People v. Balcom, 867 P.2d 777, 785 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) (Arabian, J., concurring) (“If . . .
two people claim rape, and if their stories are sufficiently similar, the chance that both are lying, or that
one is truthful and that the other invented a false story that just happens to be similar, is greatly
diminished.”); People v. VanderVliet, 508 N.W.2d 114, 128 n.35 (Mich. 1993) (“[W]e can intuitively
conclude that it is objectively improbable that three out of thirty clients would coincidentally [falsely]
accuse defendant of sexual misconduct.”); State v. Lopez, 2018 UT 5, 417 P.3d 116.
67. These provisions carve out special exceptions to the general character prohibition in the case of
allegations of sexual assault and child molestation.
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crime, or that a person would fortuitously be subject to multiple
false accusations by a number of different victims. 68
In the recent Cosby prosecution, there was only one charged victim, Ms.
Andrea Constand. 69 To persuade the trial judge to admit testimony of some of Mr.
Cosby’s 19 other accusers, the prosecution relied in part on the doctrine of chances. 70
THE CRITICISM THAT THE DOCTRINE OF CHANCES IS NOT A
LEGITIMATE, NON-CHARACTER THEORY OF LOGICAL
RELEVANCE
At the same time that the doctrine of chances has been gaining momentum
in the United States as a theory for admitting evidence of an accused’s uncharged
misconduct, the doctrine has come under sharp criticism. Although the critics differ
on some points, they tend to concur in contending that on close scrutiny, the doctrine
does not qualify as a non-character theory—thus, it is a pretext for admitting
inadmissible evidence of an accused’s bad character. There have been numerous
critics, but four are especially noteworthy.
The first was Professor Paul Rothstein, a highly respected evidence
authority, who examined the doctrine in a 1995 article. 71 He acknowledged that Dean
Wigmore had championed the theory and had claimed that it was a legitimate, noncharacter theory. 72 He also noted that decisions such as Rex v. Smith appeared to
approve of the doctrine as a non-character theory. 73 However, he contended that
Wigmore was wrong and that Smith was wrongly decided. In his view, “[i]t is
inescapable” that the doctrine requires a propensity inference. 74 Professor Rothstein
concluded that in order to apply the doctrine, the trier must assume that the accused
has a propensity to repeat this type of crime. 75
The next critic was Mr. Andrew Morris, who presented his analysis in a
1998 article. 76 At several points Mr. Morris cites Professor Rothstein’s article. 77 Like
Professor Rothstein, Mr. Morris concedes both that there are precedents approving
the doctrine and that in those precedents, the courts characterize the doctrine as a
non-character theory. 78 However, he professes that he cannot discern any noncharacter relevance in the theory. 79 Quite to the contrary, he repeatedly asserts that
it makes no sense for the trier to infer intentional misconduct unless the trier posits

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

137 CONG. REC. 6033 (1991).
See Francescani & Davis, supra note 15.
Id.
See Rothstein, supra note 17.
See id. at 1262, 1262 n.19.
See id. at 1260–61.
Id. at 1261.
See id. at 1262, 1264.
See Morris, supra note 18.
See id. at 189 n.33, 200 n.73, 201 n.75.
See id. at 191–93.
See id. at 191.
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that the accused possesses a “constant,” 80 “continuing,” 81 and “unchanging” 82 bad
character “across time,” 83 that is, at the time of all the incidents. In Mr. Morris’s
view, the only possible conclusions are that all the incidents were accidents or that
all were intentional misdeeds. 84 According to Mr. Morris, “[i]n the end,” “we cannot
dislodge propensity from [the] center” of the logic of the doctrine of chances. 85
Although Mr. Morris endorses Professor Rothstein’s view, Mr. Morris adds
an alternative argument:
Even if [it] were correct that the use of the doctrine of chances to
eliminate the odds of an accident did not involve propensity
reasoning, it bears such close similarity to propensity reasoning
that we could not seriously have faith that limiting instructions
could prevent a jury from crossing over the thin line between
eliminating the probability of accident and directly reasoning
about propensity. As a result, evidence used on this theory would
often fall to the Rule 403 balancing test. 86
That is an attractive argument. After all, “[t]here is near-consensus in evidence
scholarship that limiting instructions are especially unproductive in the context of
uncharged act evidence given the highly prejudicial nature of such evidence.” 87
The next significant article in this line is a 2005 student note dealing with
evidence of uncharged misconduct in civil employment discrimination actions. 88 In
the note, Ms. Lisa Marshall observes that such evidence is absolutely vital in civil
rights cases in general and employment discrimination actions in particular. In these
cases, the plaintiff must prove the defendant’s discriminatory intent. Since the
defendant rarely makes direct admissions of that intent, the plaintiff usually
desperately needs to introduce other acts reflecting the same discriminatory
animus. 89 She observes that in such actions, plaintiffs often rely on the doctrine of
chances to justify admitting evidence of other acts. However, she finds that reliance
to be misplaced. Like Professor Rothstein and Mr. Morris, she believes that the logic
of the doctrine does not render the evidence relevant unless one posits the
defendant’s bad, discriminatory character. 90 In her view, when the trier of fact turns
to the doctrine of chances, the trier’s “logic” is necessarily “propensity-based.” 91 The

80. Id. at 194, 201.
81. Id. at 195, 199, 201.
82. Id. at 201.
83. Id. at 194.
84. See id. at 203.
85. Id. at 192, 203.
86. Id. at 200 n.74.
87. Demetria D. Frank, The Proof Is in the Prejudice: Implicit Racial Bias, Uncharged Act Evidence
& the Colorblind Courtroom, 32 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1, 37 (2016).
88. See Marshall, supra note 22, at 1064.
89. See id. at 1066, 1080–83.
90. See id. at 1071–72.
91. Id. at 1081.
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evidence is absolutely irrelevant unless the trier assumes that the defendant employer
has an “enduring propensity to act in a given way” across time. 92
The most recent article in this line is a 2018 article by Professor Frederic
Bloom. 93 Professor Bloom concurs with Professor Rothstein. 94 Professor Bloom
states that the doctrine of chances works only if there is something that “connect[s]
the acts: the fires, the bruises, the lotteries, the tubs.” 95 Like Professor Rothstein, Mr.
Morris, and Ms. Marshall, Professor Bloom concludes that the “something” must be
propensity. “It must be the intentional, repeated scheming of the defendant—the
penchant of that defendant to commit similar crimes in similar ways over and over:
to set similar fires, to inflict similar bruises, to contrive similar lotto victories, to
drown similar victims.” 96 The bottom line for Professor Bloom is that the doctrine
of chances rests on nothing more than “improper character reasoning.” 97
In sum, the criticism of the doctrine is reducible to two basic objections.
One is that the doctrine does not possess legitimate non-character relevance. The
second is that even if the doctrine does possess some minimal non-character
relevance, when uncharged misconduct testimony is admitted under the theory there
is an intolerable risk that the lay jurors will disregard the judge’s limiting instruction
and misuse the testimony as character evidence. As we shall now see, neither
objection warrants the rejection of the doctrine.
THE UNSOUNDNESS OF THE CRITICISMS OF THE DOCTRINE OF
CHANCES
To begin with, the doctrine does rest on a solid non-character theory of
logical relevance. As Professor David Leonard has pointed out, the doctrine of
objective chances rests on probability reasoning. 98 There has been a formal
demonstration that the theory of logical relevance underlying the doctrine is
consistent with conventional statistical reasoning. When the proponent can lay a
proper foundation, the result of the doctrine’s applicability is a reduction of the
probability that random, innocent chance accounts for the other death, the instance
of possessing illegal drugs, or the accusation. 99 Furthermore, the statistical reasoning
does not entail any assumption about the accused’s subjective bad character. 100 None
of the formulae includes a variable for the accused’s character.
However, that technical statistical argument has not halted criticism of the
theory. Perhaps the following two hypotheticals, based on variations of the Woods
fact situation, will suffice. In both hypotheticals, like Mrs. Woods, the accused takes
92. See id. at 1080–81.
93. See Frederic Bloom, Character Flaws, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 1101 (2018).
94. See id. at 1143–44.
95. Id. at 1144.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. David P. Leonard, The New Wigmore: Evidence of Other Misconduct and Similar Events § 6.3.1,
at 432 (2d ed. 2019).
99. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the Character Evidence
Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical Relevance, the Doctrine of Chances, 40 U.
RICH. L. REV. 419, 448–57 (2006).
100. Id.
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children into his or her custody—perhaps as the operator of a large daycare center.
And, as in Woods, the children in the accused’s custody suffer a number of cyanotic
episodes.
In the first hypothetical, the operator of the day care center is none other
than Jeffrey Dahmer, one of the most notorious serial killers in the history of the
United States. 101 Dahmer is believed to have murdered 17 men and boys between
1978 and 1991. Roughly a third of his victims were teenagers, several as young as
14. He was called the “Milwaukee Cannibal” and the “Milwaukee Monster” because
many of his murders involved necrophilia, dismemberment, and cannibalism. For
purposes of this variation of the hypothetical, make the following assumptions:
Dahmer is charged with attempted infanticide, the attempted
murder of a child who suffered symptoms of respiratory difficulty and cyanosis at
the daycare center.
While Dahmer claims the episode was an accident, the prosecution
counters that Dahmer suffocated the child.
Fifteen years earlier, just after Dahmer opened his day care center,
a previous child in Dahmer’s custody suffered a similar fate.
Data from the state agency overseeing day care centers indicates
that on average, during the typical 15-year period among the children at day centers
as large as Dahmer’s, there would be two cyanotic episodes.
The prosecution has competent evidence that outside the day care
center, Dahmer committed the 17 murders, again many involving necrophilia,
dismemberment, and cannibalism.
How would the character evidence rules codified in Federal Rules 404–05, apply in
this hypothetical?
The general prohibition would preclude the prosecution from offering the
testimony about the 17 other gruesome murders. Without additional facts, the only
evident relevance of that testimony is to support the simplistic character argument
“he did it once, therefore he did it again.” It is true that the majority of the 17 victims
were adult males. However, even if all the victims had been young boys, it would
not change the outcome of the character analysis. Decreasing the age of some of the
earlier 17 victims would strengthen the character inference in the pending attempted
infanticide prosecution, but that would not alter the nature of the inference. Unless
the prosecution could invoke the doctrine of chances, the prosecution cannot escape
from relying on a character theory.
In addition, the prosecution could not justify introducing that testimony
under the doctrine of chances. As previously stated, the second element of the
foundation for invoking the doctrine is that the uncharged act be generally similar to
the charged offense. However, the dissimilar charged offense lacks any of the
features—necrophilia, dismemberment, or cannibalism—that became the hallmarks
of the handiwork of the Milwaukee Monster.
Next, what if the prosecution eschewed the testimony about the 17 murders
and proffered only the testimony about the second cyanotic episode? The prosecution
could not offer the testimony about the other incident simply to show that Dahmer

101. See John Philip Jenkins, Jeffrey Dahmer: American Serial Killer, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jeffrey-Dahmer [https://perma.cc/Q8YU-RLY9].
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has a propensity to harm children. That theory would run directly afoul of the general
character prohibition.
However, finally we reach the critical question: could the prosecution
invoke the doctrine to justify admitting that testimony? The answer is clearly “no.”
The third element of the foundation is proof of an extraordinary coincidence. By
aggregating the charged and uncharged incidents, the prosecution can show that the
accused was personally involved in such incidents more frequently than the average,
innocent person. Here the state data establishes that the baseline for similar day care
centers during a 15-year period is two incidents. Even if the prosecution points to the
second cyanotic episode, the prosecution showing falls short of establishing an
extraordinary coincidence, exceeding the ordinary frequency. Jeffrey Dahmer may
be the Milwaukee Monster—the epitome of evil—but the prosecution cannot rely on
the doctrine to rationalize admitting the testimony about the second incident. Simply
stated, without the required showing of extraordinary coincidence, Dahmer’s
depraved personal character is an insufficient condition for triggering the doctrine.
Now consider the second variation of the hypothetical. In this variation, the
accused is Mother Teresa. Like Dahmer, Mother Teresa operates a large day care
center. Like Dahmer, in the instant hypothetical case she is charged with the
attempted infanticide of a child in her custody. Like Dahmer, she contends that the
cyanotic episode was an accident. However, in this variation of the hypothetical,
during the preceding 15-year period three other children at Mother Teresa’s center
experienced cyanosis. How would the character evidence rules apply here?
First, if the prosecution offered the testimony about the other children to
show that Mother Teresa had a tendency to harm children, the prosecution would
suffer the same fate as when it urged that contention against Dahmer. Mother Teresa
would win because that the theory is classic character reasoning: “she did it once,
therefore she did it again.”
Next, the prosecution turns to the doctrine of chances—the theory the
Milwaukee Monster successfully opposed. Mother Teresa’s case, though, is readily
distinguishable; all three elements of the doctrine are present here. First, assume that
the prosecution has enough evidence of her involvement in the second incident to
satisfy the minimal standard of Federal Rule 104(b). Second, unlike Dahmer’s
depraved murders, the second cyanotic episode could easily be sufficiently similar
to the charged crime. In Woods, the court found sufficient similarity among all 21
incidents. Third and most importantly, now the prosecution can establish the
extraordinary coincidence that triggers the doctrine of chances. The baseline
frequency in the corresponding part of the population is two incidents, but as the
operator of this day care center Mother Teresa has had four incidents. Mother
Teresa’s otherwise saintly character does not negate any element of the foundation
for the doctrine of chances. Dahmer’s variation of the hypothetical demonstrates that
a personal bad character is an insufficient condition for applying the doctrine, and
Mother Teresa’s variation proves that a subjective bad character is not a necessary
condition for applying the doctrine. In both variations, the decisive question is the
accused’s involvement in a certain number of incidents—not whether the accused
has a monstrous or saintly character. Hence, the doctrine of objective chances does
rest on a legitimate non-character theory of logical relevance—rebutting the critics’
first objection to the use of the doctrine.
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However, that conclusion does not end the analysis. Remember Mr.
Morris’s second objection that even if the doctrine is technically a non-character
theory, the distinction between reliance on the doctrine and improper character
reasoning is so thin that under Rule 403 the judge should bar the evidence. Does that
objection warrant rejecting the doctrine of chances? When in fact there is an
intolerable risk that a jury will disregard a limiting instruction, under Rule 403 the
judge can exclude otherwise admissible evidence. 102 If the jury disregarded the
instruction and misused the evidence, there would often be a risk that they could
decide the case on an improper basis—again the probative danger Bentham termed
“misdecision.” 103 This objection appears plausible given the “near-consensus in
evidence scholarship” 104 that uncharged misconduct evidence poses an acute risk
that the jury will be tempted to punish the accused for the uncharged misdeeds, not
because the prosecution has proven guilt of the charged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.
However, there are three retorts to this objection. To begin with, the
objection based on Rule 403 cannot support a categorical ban on the use of the
doctrine of chances. Rule 403 must be construed in context and reconciled with Rule
402. 105 Rule 402 has the effect of depriving the courts of the power to enunciate and
enforce categorical, uncodified exclusionary rules of evidence. 106 Rule 402 provides
that:
Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following
provides otherwise:
- the United States Constitution;
- a federal statute;
- these rules; or
- other rules prescribed the Supreme Court. 107
In turn, Rule 101(b)(5) states that “a ‘rule prescribed by the Supreme Court’
means a rule adopted by the Supreme Court under statutory authority,” 108 such as the
formally promulgated Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure. Conspicuously
absent is any mention of case or decisional law. In a passage that the Supreme Court
has twice approvingly cited, 109 the late Professor Edward Cleary, Reporter for the
original Advisory Committee that drafted the Rules, declared: “In principle, under
the Federal Rules no common law of evidence remains.” 110 The only way to
102. See FED R. EVID. 403.
103. BENTHAM, supra note 28.
104. Frank, supra note 87, at 37.
105. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6
REV. LITIG. 129 (1987).
106. See id. at 130–38; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in
Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41
VAND. L. REV. 879 (1988).
107. FED. R. EVID. 402.
108. FED. R. EVID. 101(b)(5).
109. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587–88 (1993); United States v. Abel,
469 U.S. 45, 46–49 (1984).
110. Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 908,
915 (1978).
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harmonize Rule 403 with Rule 402 is to construe Rule 403 as authorizing the judge
to make only ad hoc, case-specific rulings rather than categorical pronouncements. 111
On the facts in a given case, a trial judge well might conclude there was an
unacceptable risk that a jury would be unwilling or unable to follow a limiting
instruction based on the doctrine of chances. However, given Rules 402–03, the
judge cannot rule that there is always such a risk that the prosecution can never rely
on the doctrine.
The second retort to the objection is that the argument tends to prove too
much. Without more, the existence of a risk that the jury will disregard a Rule 105
limiting instruction does not justify invoking Rule 403. Whenever the prosecution
attempts to introduce testimony about a “crime” or civil “wrong” 112 logically
relevant under the doctrine, the testimony has dual relevance. Testimony about a
crime or wrong other than the charged offense is necessarily relevant to show the
accused’s bad character as well as to trigger the doctrine. There would thus be a Rule
105 limiting instruction at the accused’s timely request. 113 Even if the limiting
instruction restricted the jury to use the evidence to decide whether to apply the
doctrine, there is at least a possibility that the jury would disregard the instruction
and treat the evidence as proof of the accused’s bad character. Whatever theory the
prosecution used to satisfy Rule 404(b), that possibility would always exist. If the
courts took the position that mere possibility is enough to warrant exclusion under
Rule 403, the courts would render Rule 404(b) nugatory. In effect, the courts would
have abolished Rule 404(b) because 403 would always override 404(b).
Finally, although there may indeed be a near-consensus belief “in the
evidence scholarship,” that widespread belief may be incorrect. In 2013, Professor
David Sklansky published a comprehensive review of the empirical studies of the
effectiveness of jury charges such as limiting instructions. 114 He was not content to
survey the articles describing the beliefs of attorneys or evidence scholars. Rather,
he collected the literature describing the extant psychological research into the
question—33 studies in toto. In his view, the negative assessments of jury
instructions are “at best greatly exaggerated.” 115 He concluded that “[t]he
conventional wisdom about evidentiary instructions—’of course they don’t work’”
is “unduly pessimistic.” 116
In a 2017 interview, Daniel Kahneman, the Princeton University
psychologist who won the Nobel Prize in 2002, argued that even curative instructions
to disregard are often effective. 117 If anything, curative instructions have been
ridiculed even more roundly than limiting instructions. 118 That skepticism is

111. See Imwinkelried, supra note 105, at 137; Imwinkelried, supra note 106.
112. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
113. FED. R. EVID. 105.
114. See David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L. REV. 407,
410, 414–19, 424–30, 451 (2013).
115. Id. at 407.
116. Id. at 409–10.
117. See David A. Wenner, Under the Surface, TRIAL, Apr. 2017, at 22, 26.
118. See Paul Marcotte, ‘The Jury Will Disregard . . .’, 73 A.B.A. J. 34, 34–35 (1987) (describing an
American Foundation study); Nicole M. Priolo, Evidence—Can a Curative Instruction Effectively Remedy
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understandable: the jury has already been exposed to the evidence, but the judge is
telling the jury to put it completely out of mind—”Remember to forget that
testimony.” 119 Kahneman’s research has identified a difference between System 1
reasoning, which is intuitive and sometimes subconscious, and System 2 reasoning,
which is a controlled, conscious mental process. 120 If the jurors voted immediately
after entering the deliberation room, their System 1 reasoning could dominate. They
might well disregard or overlook an instruction about the limited use of evidence
admitted under the doctrine of chances. However, in most cases, jurors have a
discussion before they take the initial vote. 121 That delay gives slow, reflective
System 2 reasoning time to operate. As Professor Kahneman points out, even if many
or most of the jurors would be inclined to slight the instruction, during discussion a
conscientious juror is likely to remind them of the judge’s charge. 122 At least one of
the 12 is likely to pay enough attention to the judge’s instruction and be scrupulous
enough to call the charge to the attention of the other jurors. Professor Kahneman
concludes that as a group, a jury may be more capable of following such instructions
than an individual juror would be. 123 In short, the near-consensus in “evidence
scholarship” may reflect an inaccurate, unduly pessimistic view of the jury’s ability
to follow limiting instructions. To be sure, there will be cases in which the trial judge
should realistically conclude that on the specific facts, there is a grave risk that the
jury will disregard the Rule 105 instruction and misuse the evidence. 124 However,
the empirical record does not support a general ban on resort to the doctrine, much
less a categorical ban.
IMPROVING THE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE DOCTRINE
Although it would be a mistake to repudiate the doctrine, it is undeniable
that the judicial administration of the doctrine should be improved. Reform efforts
should be redirected from attacking the doctrine to advocating for three changes.

Impermissible References to a Defendant’s Past Criminal Behavior?—State v. Gallagher, 645 A.2d 1206
(R.I. 1995), 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 583, 583–84 (1997).
119. Virginia Cope, Can Jurors Ignore Inadmissible Evidence, 24 Trial 80, 81 (Sept. 1988).
120. See Wenner, supra note 117, at 22.
121. LAWRENCE J. SMITH, ART OF ADVOCACY: SUMMATION § 1.04[1][d].
122. See Wenner, supra note 117, at 26.
123. See id. (distinguishing between juror decision-making and jury decision-making).
124. See RONALD L. CARLSON & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, DYNAMICS OF TRIAL PRACTICE:
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS § 15-3(A), at 511–12 (5th ed. 2017). The authors note that on several
occasions the Supreme Court itself has rejected the assumption that the jury would be capable of following
a particular type of instruction: Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (a limiting instruction as to
party), Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (a curative instruction to disregard), and Shephard v.
United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933) (a limiting instruction as to purpose, the very type of Rule 105
instruction that the judge gives under Rule 404(b)). In these cases, three factors concurred to create a
probability that the instruction would be ineffective: the declarant had personal knowledge of the fact
asserted; the declarant’s statement was directly relevant to a central issue in the case; and the declarant
was either the opposing party or someone with a close relationship to the opposing party.
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First, whenever the prosecution explicitly relies on the doctrine, 125 the judge
should directly address the question of the baseline frequency of the event, such as
the frequency of cyanotic episodes in the relevant portion of the general population.
Sadly, in many cases, the lower courts apply the doctrine in a loose, unprincipled
manner. In many cases in which the prosecution offers uncharged misconduct
evidence to prove intent and, in which on close examination, the doctrine is the only
potential non-character theory, neither the prosecution nor the judge expressly
mentions the doctrine. 126 That is a failing in both federal and state practice. Likewise,
the analysis of the relative frequency issue is superficial. It is not enough that there
is testimony about “numerous” or “several” other incidents. That testimony misses
the mark. The testimony suffices only if, collectively with the charged offense, the
other incidents amount to an extraordinary coincidence, exceeding the ordinary
incidence or baseline. Of course, there are cases such as “the Brides in the Bath” in
Smith when, without other evidence such as epidemiological data about the incidence
of pediatric cyanosis episodes, the judge can be relatively confident that the type of
event in question is a “once in a lifetime” experience for the typical, innocent person.
However, if the question is the incidence of pediatric episodes in a large children’s
hospital over a multi-year period, it is not evident that the event falls into the “once
in a lifetime” category. Evidence reformers should strongly urge that the trial judge
demand a showing of the baseline. 127
Although the first reform is substantive in character, the second is
procedural. If the prosecution intends to offer uncharged misconduct evidence at
trial, the prosecution ought to be obliged to give the defense pretrial notice of its
intent to do so. 128 Although the original version of Federal Rule 404(b) did not
impose that obligation, in 1991 the rule was amended to do so. 129 The 1991
amendment requires the prosecution to disclose “the general nature of any such
evidence,” 130 and there is a pending amendment to expand the notice obligation and
require the prosecution to identify the non-character theory that it intends to rely on
to justify the admission of the evidence. 131 A notice requirement is especially useful
when that theory is the doctrine of chances. Given the doctrine’s foundational
requirements, after receiving notice, the defense can profitably conduct a pretrial

125. The prosecution must do so whenever there is no other tenable non-character theory. In that event,
the doctrine of chances becomes the prosecution’s last resort. See Leonard, supra note 11, at 164;
Imwinkelried, supra note 57, at 870.
126. See Imwinkelried, supra note 57, at 870.
127. See id. at 875–76.
128. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Worst Surprise of All: No Right to Pretrial Discovery
of the Prosecution’s Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 247 (1987).
129. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment.
130. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2)(A).
131. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE,
BANKRUPTCY, AND CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 43–46 (2018),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-08-15-preliminary_draft_rev._8-22-18_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9GGL-VDEU] (the amendment would:
1) eliminate the need for the defense to request discovery; and
2) require the prosecution to disclose “the reasoning that supports the purpose” for admitting the
evidence).
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investigation of (1) the sufficiency of the evidence that the accused committed the
other act, (2) the similarity between that act and the charged offense, and (3) the
baseline frequency of such events in the general population. The 1991 Rule 404(b)
amendment is eminently sensible because it is ridiculous to expect the defense to
effectively attack the adequacy of the proof of these foundational elements if the
prosecution springs the evidence as a surprise on the defense at trial. A few handfuls
of states have followed the lead of the 1991 Rule 404(b) amendment and adopted a
pretrial notice requirement by rule or case law. 132 However, in the vast majority of
states there is no precedent, rule, or statute recognizing a notice requirement.
Evidence reformers should call on these states to follow the example of the 1991
Rule 404(b) amendment.
Like the second reform, the third is procedural in nature. At trial when the
judge admits the prosecution evidence only pursuant to the doctrine, the judge should
give the jury a clearer instruction that (1) mentions only the doctrine and (2) explains
the reasoning underlying the doctrine, especially the key requirement to show an
extraordinary coincidence. Mr. Morris is correct in stating that there can be a very
“thin line” between jury use of uncharged misconduct evidence under the doctrine
and jury treatment of the evidence as proof of the accused’s bad character. 133 In a
1991 decision, Estelle v. McGuire, the Supreme Court reviewed the instructions in a
child abuse prosecution implicating the doctrine of chances. 134 While none of the
justices questioned the legitimacy of the doctrine, in their concurring and dissenting
opinion Justices O’Connor and Stevens argued there was a due process violation
warranting federal habeas corpus relief. 135 They both thought the trial judge’s vague
instruction blurred the distinction between the doctrine and character reasoning to
the point of confusing a typical lay juror. 136
Research reveals no jurisdiction, federal or state, which has a special
limiting instruction devoted to the doctrine of objective chances. 137 Worse still,
although there is an incipient trend to the contrary, 138 many state appellate courts still
countenance the trial judge’s administration of “shotgun” instructions—instructions
which do not single out the non-character theory the judge finds applicable but rather
list several non-character uses of uncharged misconduct evidence. 139 By way of
example, if a state has adopted a version of Rule 404(b), consider a case where the
doctrine is used to introduce evidence to prove actus reus and negate a claim of
“accident.” A judge might track the language of the rule and instruct the jury that
they may use the evidence as proof of the accused’s “motive, opportunity, intent,

132. These states include Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming. See 2 EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 9:10 (rev. ed. 1998, Supp. 2018).
133. Morris, supra note 18, at 200 n.74.
134. 502 U.S. 62 (1991).
135. Id. at 484 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. Id. at 485.
137. See Imwinkelried, supra note 57, at 874 n.153 (collecting the pattern instructions on uncharged
misconduct evidence in both federal and state jurisdictions).
138. See LEONARD, supra note 98, § 4.5.1, at 280–85; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 132, § 9:74.
139. Imwinkelried, supra note 132, § 9:74.
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preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” 140
Mentioning the other theories is objectionable. In the example case above, the
uncharged misconduct might be relevant to proving the accused’s identity as the
perpetrator—but only if the jury engages in character reasoning to reach that
conclusion. 141 A “shotgun” instruction virtually invites the jurors to engage in
character reasoning. If we are to take the character evidence prohibition seriously,
judges cannot be allowed to take a “kitchen sink” or “smorgasbord” approach to
drafting the limiting instruction. 142
When the judge decides to permit the prosecution to rely on the doctrine,
the judge must give the jury a carefully crafted, forceful instruction. The instruction
should include a negative prong, forbidding the jury from inferring the accused’s bad
character and then treating his or her character as circumstantial proof of their
conduct on the charged occasion. The judge must tell the jury in no uncertain terms
that they may not simplistically reason “he did it once, therefore he did it again.” 143
However, the real challenge facing the trial judge is drafting the affirmative prong of
the instruction, identifying the permissible use of the evidence. Rather than drafting
the instruction at a high level of abstraction, the instruction should incorporate the
case-specific facts highlighting the extraordinary coincidence issue. The following
language has been proposed:
[I]n deciding this case, you may rely on your knowledge of the
way things happen in the real world. You may ask yourself: How
likely is it that an innocent person would twice be found driving a
car containing cocaine in the trunk? Innocent people sometimes
find themselves in suspicious circumstances. However, use your
common sense and decide whether it is likely that that would
happen to an innocent person twice. If you find that that is at odds
with everyday experience, you may conclude that on one or both
of those occasions the defendant had the intent to possess the
cocaine. 144
CONCLUSION
It would be a mistake to jettison the character evidence prohibition
altogether. The risk of misdecision has exceptional significance in the United States.
That risk may be of general policy concern to a British or Australian court, but the
United States has a unique, constitutional guarantee against criminalizing status
offenses. 145 Moreover, although some claim that character evidence can be highly
probative in certain types of prosecutions, 146 that claim is overstated. The current
140. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
141. See Imwinkelried, supra note 132, § 9:74.
142. See Leonard, supra note 11, at 149 n.140.
143. See Imwinkelried, supra note 132, § 9:74.
144. Imwinkelried, supra note 57, at 878.
145. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
146. See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability and Sex Offense Cases and Other
Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 20–21 (1994). Mr. Karp was one of the drafters of what would eventually
become Federal Rules of Evidence 413–15, creating exceptions to the character evidence prohibition in
sexual assault and child abuse cases. Id. at 15.
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state of the empirical research indicates that character can serve as a reliable predictor
of conduct only when the inference of character is supported by a large number of
very similar instances of behavior. 147 As previously stated, a meta-analysis of the
available studies found that when the inference is supported by only one other
instance of behavior, the predictive reliability of the inference is “at best .30” 148—
under random chance. Federal Rules of Evidence 413–15 have carved out exceptions
to the character prohibition for cases involving allegations of sexual assault and child
abuse. 149 One of the major weaknesses of such rules is that they permit the trier of
fact to infer the accused’s character from a single other instance of conduct—an
inference that seems utterly indefensible.
However, it would also be a mistake to repudiate the doctrine of objective
chances as a non-character theory for introducing uncharged misconduct evidence.
It is true that throughout its development in the United States, the doctrine has been
sharply criticized as nothing more than a pretext for admitting evidence of an
accused’s bad character. Critics have repeatedly asserted that evidence introduced
under the doctrine lacks genuine non-character relevance. As we have seen, the
critics contend that the logic of the doctrine must posit the accused’s subjective bad
character at the time of all the incidents. This essay has hopefully exposed the
unsoundness of that criticism. To begin with, if the doctrine’s logic assumed the
accused’s bad character at the time of all the incidents, one would think that the final
inference would be that all the incidents were accidents or that all were crimes.
However, as the Woods court correctly concluded, the only necessary inference from
the doctrine’s application is that one or some of the incidents are crimes.
Furthermore, the analysis of the Dahmer hypothetical shows that the accused’s evil
character is certainly not a sufficient condition for invoking the doctrine. Most
importantly, the Mother Teresa variation of the hypothetical has demonstrated that
the accused’s bad character is not a necessary condition for triggering the doctrine.
The stakes are higher than the survival of the doctrine of objective chances.
Despite the serious questions raised by the related empirical research, Rules 413–15
took effect. Their enactment reflects the strength of the political movements to
combat sexual offenses and child abuse. Congress enacted the rules as legislation
over the strenuous objection of both the United States Judicial Conference and the
American Bar Association. 150 The rejection of the doctrine would strengthen the
political forces attacking the character evidence prohibition. 151 Consider the fact
situations in both Smith and Woods. Put yourselves in the shoes of a typical lay juror.
147. See Imwinkelried, supra note 32, at 752–59.
148. See Fleeson, supra note 33, at 1013; see also Justin Sevier, Legitimizing Character Evidence, 68
EMORY L. J. 441, 460 (2019) (urging the liberalization of the ban on character evidence. However, the
author acknowledges that “[i]n the 1960s, psychologist Walter Mischel stunned personality theorists when
he performed a meta-analysis of the effects of personality on subsequent behavior and found only a
moderate correlation (r = .30)—meaning that personality provides little predictive ability of subsequent
behavior. A series of classic experiments examining the role of character traits on subsequent behavior
supported Professor Mischel’s meta-analysis. Researchers found, almost uniformly, no effects of a
person’s personality characteristics on her subsequent behaviors; instead, they found effects of . . .
situational variables.”).
149. FED. R. EVID. 413–15.
150. See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 132, § 2:25.
151. See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 99.
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How would you have felt in Smith if, after voting to acquit, you learned that the judge
denied you evidence that two other women purportedly married to the accused were
also found drowned in their bathtubs? Or how would you have felt in Woods if, after
an acquittal, you discovered that the judge had excluded evidence that other children
in the accused’s custody had suffered 20 other cyanotic episodes? It is submitted that
you would be shocked to the point of anger. You probably would have a classic
Dickensian reaction: “[i]f the [evidence] law supposes that, . . . the law is a[n]
ass.” 152 Or, in the words of Rex v. Smith, you well might regard that result an
“affront” to your common sense. 153 In the United States, the character evidence rule
has been under siege since the early 1990s. 154 If the courts bar valuable evidence that
possesses legitimate non-character relevance under the doctrine in child abuse and
drug prosecutions, the negative public may hasten the demise of the general character
evidence prohibition. In the long run, continued attacks on the doctrine of objective
chances will only play into the hands of the opponents of restrictions on evidence of
the accused’s subjective bad character. The upshot is that evidence reformers should
focus on improving the administration of the doctrine of objective chances rather
than seeking its abolition.

152. CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 448 (Barnes & Noble Books 2004) (1867).
153. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 759.
154. See Sevier, supra note 148 (explaining and countering the modern consensus that character
evidence is illegitimate). The bill, which eventually became Federal Rules 413-15, was first introduced in
1991. See 137 CONG. REC. 5915 (1991).

